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INTRODUCTION

The 2009 Green Revolution in Iran has been dubbed the “Twitter
Revolution” due to the importance of social media in mobilizing
protesters against a seemingly rigged election. However, the revolution also illustrated a problem with U.S. sanctions against Iran:
protestors did not have access to certain information and communications technology (“ICT”) that had been restricted by sanctions or
that had not otherwise been made available by companies because
of perceived risks of doing business in the heavily sanctioned country.
Sanctions prohibit the exportation of technological goods and
services from the United States or by U.S. persons to Iran.1 The U.S.
Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”)
has issued general licenses since the Green Revolution authorizing
the exportation of fee and non-fee based technology.2 These licenses
allow the exportation of services, software, and hardware like messengers, social media platforms, applications (“apps”), web browsers, phones, and laptops.3 Despite these reforms, there is still great
uncertainty and ICT companies face tremendous legal, reputational,
and financial risks. The recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(“JCPOA”) does little to address these risks, as it does not lift ICT
sanctions. As a result, Iranians still do not have access to important
ICT tools. This is significant because it impedes Iranian civilians’
ability to communicate with one another and mobilize against their
1
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2015)
(“[T]he exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the
United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran is prohibited . . . .”). See also
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations Involving Sanctions Against
Iran (Jan 23, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf (“In general, a person may not export from the U.S.
any goods, technology or services, if that person knows or has reason to know such
items are intended specifically for supply, transshipment or reexportation to
Iran.”).
2
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License Related to Personal Communication
Services (2010); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain
Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (2014).
3
Id.
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government, hindering the same freedoms that sanctions are meant
to protect.
This comment argues that U.S. sanctions against Iran affecting
ICT companies have had adverse consequences for both Iranians
and U.S. foreign policy. Sanctions have limited the ability of Iranians to access information and communicate. Resultantly, they have
not had their intended effect of giving Iranian civilians ICT tools in
order to support a robust civil society. U.S. foreign policy interests
have thus been undermined.
This comment explores how U.S. sanctions against Iran have affected the ICT sector, what implications this has for Iranians and
U.S. foreign policy, and how stakeholders can improve the sanctions
regime and incentivize the ICT sector in a way that promotes both
Iranians’ freedoms and U.S. foreign policy interests. Section 2 of this
paper reviews the sanctions regime imposed by the United States.
Section 3 looks at the effect of sanctions, including how ICT companies make decisions when dealing with sanctions, what their responses have been to the sanctions regime after the U.S. government’s easing of sanctions, and the implications that sanctions and
companies’ responses to sanctions have on Iranians’ freedoms and
the United States’ stated goals for sanctions. Section 4 considers approaches the U.S. government, ICT companies, and civil society
should take to promote the well-being of Iranians and serve U.S. foreign policy goals.
Since sanctions have had the unintended effect of restricting civil
society mobilization in Iran, this comment recommends that the U.S.
government further target sanctions, create more authorizations,
ease financial restrictions, and increase information transparency.
This would have the effect of incentivizing companies to export
technology to Iran and provide these mobilization tools to Iranians.
The United States should seize this opportunity to improve the sanctions regime by incentivizing companies in a way that promotes Iranians’ freedoms and U.S. foreign policy goals.
2.

U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN AFFECTING ICT COMPANIES

2.1. Purpose
U.S. sanctions against Iran are incredibly expansive and complex. The U.S. government began imposing broad sanctions against
Iran in response to threats to U.S. national security, foreign policy,
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and the economy following the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in
Tehran.4 The purpose of the sanctions regime has evolved over
time. The United States continued to impose sanctions after the hostage crisis in the 1980s and 1990s to compel Iran to cease supporting
terrorist activities.5 In the 2000s and 2010s, sanctions were a response to concerns about Iran’s nuclear proliferation program6 and
human rights violations.7 Based on these foreign policy and national
4
Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (blocking Iranian
Government property upon finding that “the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy”).
See
also
U.S.
Dep’t
of
State,
Iran
Sanctions,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2015)
(providing an overview of U.S. sanctions against Iran); KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 1 (2015) (detailing the history and objectives of initial sanctions); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ANN
ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 626–35
(1st ed. 1985) (chronicling events leading up to U.S. sanctions and U.S. statements
about sanctions); Patrick Clawson, Iran, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 85, 85 (Richard Haass ed., 1998) (describing initial sanctions against Iran
under the Carter administration).
5 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012) (granting authority to the president when there is an
“unusual and extraordinary threat”). Note that the original statute was titled the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and was retitled in 2006 after the Libya sanctions were
lifted. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 3, 110 Stat. 1541,
1541 (1996) (declaring U.S. policy to “deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism”). See also Clawson, supra note 4, at 86–89 (describing sanctions
against Iran under the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations to combat terrorism).
6 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-195, § 3, 124 Stat. 1312, 1314 (2010) (“[I]nternational diplomatic efforts to
address Iran's illicit nuclear efforts and support for international terrorism are more
likely to be effective if strong additional sanctions are imposed on the Government
of Iran . . . .”); U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 4 (identifying that an aim of sanctions
is “(1) to block the transfer of weapons, components, technology, and dual-use
items to Iran’s prohibited nuclear and missile programs; (2) to target select sectors
of the Iranian economy relevant to its proliferation activities; and (3) to induce Iran
to engage constructively” with the international community “to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations”).
7 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112158, § 101, 126 Stat. 1214, 1217 (2012) (“Among the economic measures to be taken
are . . . . (4) a focus on countering Iran's efforts to evade sanctions, including—(A)
the activities of telecommunications, Internet, and satellite service providers, in and
outside of Iran, to ensure that such providers are not participating in or facilitating,
directly or indirectly, the evasion of the sanctions regime with respect to Iran or
violations of the human rights of the people of Iran . . . .”). See also DIANNE E.
RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43311, IRAN: U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE
AUTHORITY TO LIFT RESTRICTIONS 1 (2015) (describing the human rights objectives of
the sanctions regime).
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security concerns, Congress and the Executive have imposed extensive sanctions affecting technology, shipping, insurance, oil, banking, trade, and aid.8
Sanctions specific to the ICT sector have been imposed to foster
information and communication to, from, and among Iranian civilians. They also attempt to curtail censorship, monitoring, and other
human rights abuses by the Iranian government. Sanctions accordingly include “sensitive technology” that could be used for censorship and surveillance, including tools that allow the Iranian government to block Internet and mobile service access.9 ICT sanctions
were also imposed to block the transfer of technology in furtherance
of Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities.10
2.2. Broad ICT Sanctions
U.S. sanctions on technology exports to Iran were initially so
broad that a business journal said they “could encompass everything developed in the computer age.”11 Sanctions prohibited “the
exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly,
from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran.”12 This included
a prohibition on the provision of Internet access by U.S. persons to
Iranians.13
The United States then exempted information and informational
materials from the President’s authority to impose sanctions.14 The
U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 4; RENNACK, supra note 7, at 1.
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 106(c)
(“The term ‘sensitive technology’ means hardware, software, telecommunications
equipment, or any other technology, that the President determines is to be used
specifically—(A) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in Iran; or (B) to
disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of the people of Iran.”).
10 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102.
11
Clawson, supra note 4, at 86-89 (quoting Vahe Petrossian, Iran Back in the
Firing Line, 36 MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG. 2, 2 (Dec. 4, 1992)).
12 Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2009).
13
Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560 (1991), as interpreted by
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Guidance on the Provision of Internet Connectivity Services
(June 3, 2003).
14 Congress granted the Executive Branch authority to impose sanctions under
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a). The President has the authority to, “under such regulations as
he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise—(A) investigate,
regulate, or prohibit—(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit
or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that
8
9
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Berman Amendment of 1988 created this carve-out to the President’s authority.15 The Free Trade in Ideas Amendment of 1994 affirmed the Berman Amendment, broadened it to apply regardless of
transmission format, and included examples of new media.16 Under
the new provisions, the President could no longer regulate the exportation of any information or informational materials, regardless
of format or commercial character.17
The purpose of this amendment, according to its sponsor Representative Howard Berman, was to “ensure that the President’s
power to regulate economic relations with foreign countries is not
used to inhibit communication with the people of those countries.”18
Since the Iranian government exerts strong control on the media and
blocks many websites in order to limit the type of information available to Iranians,19 allowing communication with Iranian civilians increases the sources of independent information inside Iran.
The United States subsequently eased technology restrictions
through guidance issued by OFAC in 2003. The guidance authorized the provision of “Internet connectivity services” to Iranian civilians “on a case-by-case basis by specific license,” provided that
“the main purpose is to benefit the people of Iran through increased
access to information” and that “[n]o goods, technology or software
will be exported, directly or indirectly, to Iran.”20
In 2006, the Iran Freedom Support Act (“IFSA”) authorized
spending to assist Iranians dedicated to “democratic values.”21 The
IFSA authorized the President to “provide financial and political assistance (including the award of grants) to foreign and domestic individuals, organizations, and entities working for the purpose of
such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national
thereof, (iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities . . . .” 50 U.S.C. §
1702(a) (2012).
15
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
2502(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1371 (1988).
16
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L.
No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994).
17 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2012).
18 138 Cong. Rec. 15,052 (1992) (statement of Rep. Berman).
19 See discussion infra Part 3.3.1.
20
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Guidance on the Provision of Internet Connectivity
Services (June 3, 2003).
21 Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-293, § 302, 120 Stat. 1344,
1347 (2006).
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supporting and promoting democracy for Iran.”22 Despite these
changes, ICT sanctions were still restrictive, creating problems during the 2009 Green Revolution.
2.3. A New Understanding
The U.S. government came to realize that broad ICT sanctions
were having the unintended effect of restricting Iranians’ access to
information and ability to mobilize during the Green Revolution.
Following controversy over election rigging during the 2009 Iranian
presidential election, there were a series of protests in Iran.23 During
these protests, Iranians used mobile devices and social media platforms, particularly Twitter, to communicate with one another and
organize,24 even though some of these tools were not permitted in
Iran at the time.25 These tools were so prevalent that the revolution
Id.
See generally Abbas Milani, The Iran Primer: The Green Movement, U.S. INST.
OF PEACE, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-movement (providing an
overview of the Green Revolution).
24
See, e.g., Iran and the “Twitter Revolution”, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 25,
2009), http://www.journalism.org/2009/06/25/iran-and-twitter-revolution (labeling the Green Revolution as a “Twitter Revolution” and describing the use of
social media in aiding the revolution); Lev Grossman, Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement, TIME (June 17, 2009), available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html (discussing the role of
Twitter in the protests in Iran); Andrew Sullivan, The Revolution Will Be Twittered,
THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/06/the-revolution-will-be-twittered/200478 (exemplifying the use of
Twitter during the protests in Tehran); Patrick Quirk, Iran’s Twitter Revolution,
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (June 17, 2009), http://www.fpif.org/irans_twitter_revolution (describing the significance of web-based technology and texting in the presidential election of Iran in 2009). During protests, Twitter stated that it “recognizes
the role Twitter is . . . playing as an important communication tool in Iran” and
postponed a routine maintenance shutdown at the request of the U.S. State Department. Brian Bowe, Robin Blom & Eric Freedman, Negotiating Boundaries between
Control and Dissent: Free Speech, Business, and Repressitarian Governments, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES: TRENDS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF USE 36, 48 (John Lannon & Edward Halpin, eds. 2013). Contra
Golnaz Esfandiari, The Twitter Devolution, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 8, 2010) (explaining
that Twitter usage during Iranian protests was, in fact, for spreading information
abroad: “There was no Twitter Revolution inside Iran. . . . [G]ood old-fashioned
word of mouth was by far the most influential medium used to shape the postelection opposition activity”).
25
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2009).
See also Lee Baker, The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Export Restrictions on Software
and Online Services for American Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 23 HARV. J.L. &
22
23
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was referred to as a “cyberwar” by hardliners.26 In response, the
Iranian government blocked communications among protesters by
mandating that mobile and Internet service providers turn off access
just prior to elections.27 The government blocked access to Twitter,
Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube.28 Protestors that attempted to document events had their cell phones seized and were sometimes even
arrested.29 The Iranian diaspora in America, which plays a large role
in facilitating information flows between Iran and the United
States,30 was not able to provide information to protestors because
of the government’s actions.31 This made it more difficult for protestors to communicate and organize.
The Green Revolution illustrated the importance of ICT tools in
changing the course of a nation’s history. The United States came to
understand “that prohibiting citizens in autocratic regimes from accessing such technology is inimical to the foreign policy objectives
that animate the U.S. sanctions regime.”32 The State Department recognized this in its guidance: “Over the last several years, the world
has witnessed the important role this technology can assume in
holding repressive regimes accountable, assisting people in exercising their human rights and protecting emerging elements of civil society.”33
TECH. 537, 539 (2010) (describing the illegality of providing Twitter in Iran as “an
awkward fact [that] was overlooked”).
26 Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 48.
27
See generally Freedom House, Freedom on the Net: Iran (2014), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2014/iran (describing the Iranian government’s attempts to limit information and communication among protestors by filtering websites, disrupting communication services, and blocking circumvention
tools).
28 Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 48.
29
Reporters without Borders, Enemies of the Internet: Countries under Surveillance 19 (Mar. 10, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies.pdf.
30
Ramin Bajoghli, Diaspora Community (Re)Defined: Hailing Successes, Recognizing
Failures,
PBS
(Dec.
10,
2012,
6:52
PM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/12/opinioncommunity-redefined-hailing-successes-recognizing-failures.html.
31 Farnaz Fassihi, Iranian Crackdown Goes Global, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2009, 11:59
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125978649644673331 (describing Iran’s deliberate attempts to cut off communications coming in and out of Iran and reciting
accounts of harassment faced by the Iranian diaspora at the hands of the Iranian
government).
32 Baker, supra note 25, at 540.
33
U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub. Notice 8086, State Department Sanctions Information and Guidance (Nov. 8, 2012).
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2.4. Some Reforms
Under this new understanding, efforts have been made since
2009 to ensure that sanctions do not interfere with Iranian civilians’
access to ICT tools, while still restricting “sensitive technology” that
could be used by the Iranian government for censorship and surveillance. The U.S. government’s strategy changed from allowing companies to apply for specific licenses for technology34 to setting general licenses for broader categories of ICT tools. Technology exports
authorized under these general licenses attempt to give Iranians access to information and protect them from government monitoring
and censorship.
The Victims of Iranian Censorship Act of 2009 (“VOICE Act”)35
aims to increase Iranians’ access to information and shield Iranians
against censorship attempts by the Iranian government.36 It authorizes appropriations “for the dissemination of accurate and independent information to the Iranian people through radio, television,
Internet, cellular telephone, short message service, and other communications.”37 In pursuit of this objective, appropriations can be
used to counter the Iranian government’s efforts to jam radio and
Internet transmissions and to block short message service (“SMS”)
text messages.38 However, the VOICE Act did not address the provision of communication tools by U.S. companies. The VOICE Act
also requires the President to report non-Iranian persons, including
companies, who knowingly or negligently assist the Iranian govern-

34 For examples of licenses that were granted, see Licenses Granted to U.S. Companies Run the Gamut, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions.html?_r=0 (listing licenses that have been
granted by OFAC, including licenses to Intelsat Global Service and WorldCom to
provide Iranians with Internet access and provide for the free flow of information
to and from Iran); Companies With Permission to Bypass Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-sanctions-list.html
(listing licenses that have been granted to “American companies to enter into transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by trade embargoes and sanctions
rules”).
35
The VOICE Act was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, 123 Stat. 2190 (Oct. 28, 2009).
36
Victims of Iranian Censorship Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1263, 123
Stat. 2190, 2553-54 (2009).
37 Id. at § 1263, 123 Stat. at 2553.
38 Id.
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ment in censuring online information content, blocking communications, or monitoring online activities.39 However, it does not stipulate enforcement mechanisms against identified persons.
The stated objective of the VOICE Act is to “aid the ability of the
Iranian people to – (1) gain access to and share information; (2) exercise freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly through the Internet and other electronic media; (3) engage
in Internet-based education programs and other exchanges between
Americans and Iranians; and (4) counter efforts – (A) to block, censor, and monitor the Internet; and (B) to disrupt or monitor cellular
phone networks or SMS text exchanges.”40 President Obama has
stated that the VOICE Act is part of “U.S. efforts to ensure the free
flow of information to Iran and to enhance the abilities of Iranians
to exercise their universal rights.”41 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said, “[W]e believe it’s critical that [the Internet’s]
users are assured certain basic freedoms. Freedom of expression is
first among them. . . . Blogs, emails, social networks, and text messages have opened up new forums for exchanging ideas, and created
new targets for censorship.”42
OFAC thereafter amended sanctions regulations to authorize the
exportation of ICT tools without a specific license.43 OFAC issued
the General License Related to Personal Communication Services in
2010, authorizing Internet-based personal communication services.44 It allows “[t]he exportation from the United States or by U.S.
persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of services incident to
the exchange of personal communications over the Internet . . . provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the
Id.
Id. at § 1263, 123 Stat. at 2553-54.
41
Barack Obama, Letter from the President Regarding Victims of Iranian Censorship Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/letter-president-regarding-victims-iranian-censorship-act.
42 Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Internet Freedom,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2010/01/20100121142618eaifas0.6585352.html#ixzz2nreByiQR.
43
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License Related to Personal Communication
Services (2010) (authorizing “[t]he exportation from the United States or by U.S.
persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of services incident to the exchange
of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and
email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging, provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the user”).
44 Id.
39
40
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user.”45 This includes services like “instant messaging, chat and
email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging.”46 The License incorporates elements of a bill introduced by Representative Moran to “support the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people by enhancing their ability to access the
Internet and communications services.”47
Soon after, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”) was passed in recognition
that the black market had given Iran access to sensitive dual-use
technologies. CISADA imposes financial restrictions and attempts
“to prevent the diversion of sensitive dual-use technologies to
Iran.”48 It defines “sensitive technology” as “hardware, software,
telecommunications equipment, or any other technology, that the
President determines is to be used specifically— (A) to restrict the
free flow of unbiased information in Iran; or (B) to disrupt, monitor,
or otherwise restrict speech of the people of Iran.”49
The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(“ITRSHRA”) adds new measures and procedures to the sanctions
regime. It imposes sanctions on persons that knowingly transfer or
facilitate the transfer of technologies that are likely to be used by the
Iranian government to commit human rights abuses, including
“sensitive technology.”50 It also imposes sanctions on persons who
engage in censorship or other activities that limit Iranian civilians’
freedom of expression or access to information.51
The Interpretive Guidance of 2012 issued by OFAC attempts to
provide clarifications to encourage U.S. corporations to provide ICT
products to Iranians.52 It lists illustrative, non-exhaustive examples
Id.
Id.
47 Iranian Digital Empowerment Act, H.R. 4301, 111th Congress (2009).
48
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-195, § 3, 124 Stat. 1312, 1315 (2010).
49 Id. at § 106, 124 Stat. at 1336.
50 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112158, § 402, 126 Stat. 1214, 1252 (2012). The Act codified Executive Order 13606, 77
Fed. Reg. 24571 (Apr. 22, 2012).
51 Id. at § 403, 126 Stat. at 1254.
52 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran (Mar. 20, 2012). That same day, President Obama
said, “Because of the actions of the Iranian regime, an electronic curtain has fallen
around Iran - a barrier that stops the free flow of information and ideas into the
country, and denies the rest of the world the benefit of interacting with the Iranian
45
46
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of products and services, including those that involve the transfer of
money, that can be exported to Iran from the United States or from
U.S. persons under the 2010 General License.53 OFAC wanted to
“ensure that the sanctions on Iran do not have an unintended
chilling effect on the ability of companies to provide personal communications tools to individuals in that country.”54
OFAC issued General License D in May 2013 to implement
broader authorizations for personal communications hardware,
software, and services. The license was issued in advance of the
June 2013 presidential election in Iran.55 It came amidst reports that
the Iranian government had created a unit dedicated to surveilling
social networking websites and was slowing Internet connection
speeds.56 Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman denounced the
Iranian government’s censorship as “a deliberate and unrelenting
level of repression in the lead-up to these elections.”57 Referring to
the Iranian government’s efforts to block access to the Internet and
the United States’ subsequent reform of the sanctions regime, a senior U.S. government official told the Wall Street Journal, “There’s
been an increasing trend in their efforts in new and ever-more-complex and villainous ways to crack down on the free flow of information using sophisticated methods, and this is a response to their
people, who have so much to offer.” Barack Obama, Remarks of President Obama
Marking
Nowruz,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(Mar.
20,
2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/20/remarks-presidentobama-marking-nowruz.
53 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran (Mar. 20, 2012).
54 Id.
55
Danielle Kehl, Tim Maurer & Sonia Phene, Translating Norms to the Digital
Age: Technology and the Free Flow of Information under U.S. Sanctions, NEW AM. FOUND.
12 (Dec. 4 2013), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3872-translatingnorms-to-the-digital-age/Translating_Norms_to_the_Digital_Age_Final.7d2eb446318f4534b87a5b7a38c4bfc3.pdf (recounting the Iranian government’s
“elaborate” attempts to censor, monitor, and hinder Internet communications in
advance of June 2013 elections). See also Steptoe & Johnson LLP, OFAC Issues General License Authorizing the Export to Iran of Services, Software, and Hardware Incident
to the Exchange of Personal Communications (June 4, 2013), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-8856.html (contextualizing the issuance of General License
D).
56 Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 12.
57
Agence France-Presse, State Department Official Denounces ‘Repression’ in
Lead-up to Iranian Presidential Election, RAW STORY (May 5, 2013), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/05/15/state-department-official-denounces-repression-inlead-up-to-iranian-presidential-election.
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efforts.”58 As such, General License D’s apparent goal was to provide Iranians greater access to ICT tools prior to the election.
General License D allowed the exportation of “fee-based services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the
Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging,”
“fee-based software . . . that is necessary to enable [these] services”
for which OFAC did not provide examples, and “consumer-grade
Internet connectivity services and the provision, sale, or leasing of
capacity on telecommunications transmission facilities (such as satellite or terrestrial network connectivity) incident to personal communications.”59
Most recently in 2014, General License D-1 replaced and clarified
General License D.60 While it maintains the same authorizations for
fee-based services, fee-based software, and consumer-grade Internet
connectivity services, it resolved ambiguity surrounding the term
“U.S. persons” in General License D.61 General License D, by its
plain meaning, limited its authorization to U.S. persons and prohibited the exportation of products with U.S. component parts by nonU.S. companies from outside the United States.62 General License
D-1 clarified that non-U.S. persons that have licensed components
produced in the United States can also export technology to Iran.63
Since General License D-1 was issued, OFAC has updated its frequently asked questions (“FAQs”) website.64 However, OFAC has
not issued subsequent interpretive guidance clarifying what exactly
58 Ian Sherr, Apple Eases Restrictions on Selling Products Headed to Iran, WALL ST.
J. DIGITS BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/08/27/apple-eases-trictions-on-selling-products-headed-toiran/?mod=WSJBlog.
59 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D with Respect to the Exportation and
Reexportation of Certain Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to the Exchange of Personal Communications (2013).
60
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain Services,
Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (2014).
61 Id.
62
Danielle Kehl, U.S. Government Clarifies Tech Authorizations under Iranian
Sanctions, NEW AM. FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/usgovernment-clarifies-tech-authorizations-under-iranian-sanctions.
63 Id.
64
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx#gld1 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2015) (answering questions regarding Iranian General License D-1).
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would be allowed, as it did following the General License of 2010.
This results in ambiguity that acts as a barrier for companies considering doing business in Iran.
The JCPOA, which was finalized with Iran in July 2015, will lift
sanctions related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.65 This will
have little impact on the ICT sector. The U.S. government “retains
the authority to continue imposing sanctions under other authorities, such as those used to combat terrorism, destabilizing regional
activity, and human rights violations.”66 Furthermore, there is little
chance that these sanctions will be removed anytime soon. Treasury
Secretary Jacob Lew remarked, “[D]eal or no deal, we will continue
to use all our available tools, including sanctions, to counter Iran’s
menacing behavior. Iran knows that our host of sanctions focused
on its support for terrorism and its violations of human rights are
not, and have never been, up for discussion.”67 In fact, the U.S. government continues to vigorously enforce and has even expanded
these sanctions since reaching the agreement.68 Therefore, the ICT
sanctions regime imposed against Iran due to its human rights vio-

65 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Guidance Relating to the Continuation of Certain Temporary Sanctions Relief Pursuant to the JPOA Prior to Implementation of the
JCPOA (Aug. 7, 2015).
66 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 1. For further reading, see KATZMAN, supra
note 4, at 1 (detailing the implications of JCPOA); Zachary Laub, International Sanctions on Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 15, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/iran/international-sanctions-iran/p20258; Elizabeth Whitman, What Sanctions against Iran
Won’t Be Lifted? Bans for Terrorism Support, Human Rights Abuses to Remain Intact,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 14, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/what-sanctions-against-iran-wont-be-lifted-bans-terrorism-support-human-rights-abuses2008066 (detailing the limitations of sanctions reform).
67
Jacob Lew, Remarks of Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew to the Washington Institute, WASHINGTON INST. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/remarks-of-treasury-secretary-jacob-j.-lew.
68 For example, from the signing of the Joint Plan of Action (“JPOA”)—an interim agreement reached in November 2013—through the following year, the U.S.
government “has sanctioned nearly 100 individuals and entities that were helping
Iran evade [U.S.] sanctions, aiding Iranian nuclear and missile proliferation, supporting Iranian-sponsored terrorism, or carrying out Iran-related human rights
abuses.” Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Status of Talks and the Role of Congress: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of David S.
Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Dep’t of
Treas.).
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lations will remain in place for the foreseeable future. Certain reputational risks of doing business in Iran will be reduced69 but huge
risks remain for ICT companies.
3.

RESPONSES AND EFFECTS OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME

The effect of the ICT sanctions regime has been to impede ICT
companies from doing business in Iran due to the legal, reputational, and financial risks involved. Therefore, Iranian civilians do
not have access to crucial ICT tools, and their freedoms have been
restricted. As a result, the U.S. government’s intentions behind ICT
sanctions have been undermined.
3.1. ICT Sector Decision Making
3.1.1. Legal Risks
Before analyzing ICT responses to the sanctions regime, it is of
primary importance to understand how ICT companies make decisions. There are several considerations ICT companies have when
deciding how to respond to sanctions laws. For one, companies face
legal risks in deciding whether to do business in countries where
sanctions are imposed like Iran.
Companies face a lot of uncertainty about the sanctions regime.
Sanctions regulations are incredibly complicated and vague. They
cover a wide range of activities and contain vague terms like “support,” “significant,” and “facilitate.”70 This creates ambiguity for
companies as to what technology can and cannot be legally exported
to Iran.71 Additionally, sanctions regulations are frequently evolving. Companies find it difficult to predict the future shape of the
sanctions regime,72 and therefore it is difficult for companies to form

69
See infra Part 3.1.2 and Part 3.1.3 for a discussion of reputational risks and
financial risks of doing business in Iran.
70
See Edward Krauland & Anthony Rapa, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Identifying and Managing Secondary Sanctions Risks Arising from Commercial Relationships
with Iran, 15 BUS. L. INT’L 3, 5 (Jan. 2014) (arguing that these terms create uncertainty
and therefore business risks for companies).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., J. Triplett Mackintosh & Jeremy Paner, Iran Sanctions and Compliance
Challenges Going Forward, HOLLAND & HART LLP (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.hol-
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business plans and strategies. ICT companies that provide services
and software face unique risks in this atmosphere of uncertainty. By
the nature of the online presence of the services they provide, ICT
companies might find it easier to block access to their services entirely rather than risk failing to adequately block access.
Even one small misstep could create substantial legal liability,
and the penalties for infringement are severe. Criminal violations
of federal sanctions may result in fines of up to $1 million and imprisonment for up to twenty years.73 Civil penalties may result in
fines of up to either $250,000 or an amount twice that of the illegal
transaction.74 Violators could have their U.S. assets frozen and be
prohibited from making financial transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, excluding them from the lucrative U.S.
market.75 The track record of criminal and civil penalties actually
faced by companies for violating the sanctions regime has been

landhart.com/iran-sanctions-and-compliance-challenges-going-forward (“The nature of the negotiations, domestic and international politics, and other factors make
difficult any reasonable prediction as to the shape of future of U.S. sanctions.”).
73 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 1.
74 Id.
75
See, e.g., Mackintosh & Paner, supra note 72 (advising companies on penalties arising from doing business with entities on the specially designated nationals
list, including asset freezes and market exclusion); Nick Pearson & John Fusco, Reinsurers Pressed for Compliance with Iran Sanctions, LOCKE LORD LLP (Aug. 2013),
www.lockelord.com/reinsurers-pressed-for-compliance-with-iran-sanctions-0801-2013 (counseling reinsurers that violating sanctions might result in them being
precluded from the U.S. market, being prohibited from entering into financial transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and having their property
and interests blocked, the net effect of which will prevent violators from transacting
in the United States).
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great.76 Furthermore, CISADA permits U.S. state and local governments to prohibit certain investment activities relating to Iran, exposing companies to additional legal risks and liability. 77
Moreover, parent companies, subsidiaries, and executives are
exposed to risks for the actions of affiliate entities.78 Persons that
know or have reason to know of prohibited activities committed by
any person they control are liable.79 An entity must also disclose

76 For example, in 2012, HSBC paid $1.9 billion for sanctions violations after it
did business with customers in Iran, Libya, Sudan, Burma, and Cuba. Aruna
Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in Money-Laundering
Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/ushsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211. In July 2014, BNP Paribas pled guilty to
criminal charges of violating Iran sanctions, in addition to sanctions against Cuba
and Sudan. It agreed to fire individuals associated with the violations and accepted
that it would be unable to clear certain transactions in U.S. dollars for one year.
Additionally, BNP Paribas settled for $9 billion with U.S. prosecutors, making it the
largest settlement ever for such a case. Jonathan Watson, BNP Paribas Sanctions Case
Highlights US Power over International Deals, 68(5) IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 4, 4 (Oct.
2014),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=37e22907-4a88-4a68-bbe2-52117734279e.
77
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-195, § 202, 124 Stat. 1312, 1342 (2010). The N.Y. Department of Financial
Services has been very active on this front and has entered into settlements with
companies for violating N.Y. banking laws related to federal sanctions compliance,
including settlements with Standard Chartered Bank for $340 million, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi-UFJ for $250 million, and Deloitte Financial Advisory Services for
$10 million. Meredith Rathbone, New York DFS Looks at Non-U.S. Reinsurers’ Compliance with Iran Sanctions Law, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/Rathbone%20-%20WorldECR%20issue%2024.pdf.
78
See Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Expansion of the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996 and Other New Sanctions and Legal Provisions Relating to Iran (Aug. 11,
2010),
http://www.milbank.com/images/content/7/8/786/081110_Expansion_of_the_Iran_Sanctions_Actof1996.pdf (advising clients that the amended definition of “person” expands liability to financial institutions and the amended definition of “knowingly” expands liability for parent companies); Krauland & Rapa,
supra note 70, at 6-7 (detailing the risk exposure in cases where parent companies
should have known about sanctionable conduct and subsidiaries knowingly participate in sanctionable conduct); Shearman & Sterling LLP, New US Economic Sanctions Create Risks for Non-US Financial Institutions (Sept. 2010), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2010/09/New-USEconomic-Sanctions-Create-Risks-for-Non-U__/Files/View-full-memo-New-USEconomic-Sanctions%20Create-__/FileAttachment/FIA090110NewUSEconomicSanctionsCreateRisksforNon__.pdf (advising financial institutions of risks imposed by sanctions laws on the basis of what they
knew and should have known).
79 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102.
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instances of prohibited activity by any affiliates.80 Knowledge includes instances where a person has “actual knowledge” or “should
have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.”81 What
a parent company “should have known” has been left intentionally
vague, leaving companies unsure of how much oversight and control is required.82
In order to ensure compliance with sanctions laws, companies
doing business in Iran need to have robust controls in place. The
due diligence required is such a massive undertaking that companies must determine whether they are able to “produce, maintain
and retrieve evidence of such due diligence.”83 This includes having
internal policies transparent to all employees, routinely assessing
policies to ensure alignment with legal changes, routinely screening
against the specially designated nationals (“SDN”) list,84 having procedures in place for dealing with existing contracts with persons
added to the SDN list, and maintaining records in order to file any
necessary disclosures if a violation is found and an investigation
needs to be conducted.85 Such robust legal compliance controls add
costs for companies considering doing business in Iran. Given the
complexities and costs, ICT companies tend to be extremely adverse

80 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112158, § 219, 126 Stat. 1214, 1235 (2012).
81 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 101.
82 Alexandra Anderson, Good Grief! Iran Sanctions and the Expansion of American
Corporate Liability for Non-U.S. Subsidiary Violations under the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 125, 143 (2013).
83 David Savage & Kate Hill, The Iran Threat Reduction Act—Insurers and Reinsurers Beware, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5b232505-d27a-48d3-b5b3-1805b09d180d.
84
The SDN list includes persons—individuals and entities—with whom U.S.
persons are generally prohibited from dealing. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf.
85 See, e.g., Bill Wansley, Don Pressley & Carla Duy, Iran Sanctions Compliance,
BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Iran-SanctionsFS-eng.pdf (“[W]hen dealing with the possibility of covert Iranian activities, traditional due diligence is insufficient.”); Mackintosh & Paner, supra note 72 (advising
companies to maintain compliance controls that address U.S. sanctions and prevent
individuals from facilitating trade with Iran); Pearson & Fusco, supra note 75 (describing the extensive compliance program reinsurers should have in place);
Rathbone, supra note 77 (listing information the N.Y. Department of Financial Services requested from about 20 non-U.S. reinsurers about their compliance with the
Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012).
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to the legal risks of doing business in Iran and often decide not to do
business in the sanctioned country.86
3.1.2. Reputational Risks
Companies also face reputational risks in determining whether
to do business in Iran. Iran’s government has a reputation within
the United States of being repressive,87 and companies that do business in Iran consequently risk being perceived by Americans as aiding a repressive government. An example of the risks that would be
involved comes from a company that did business in Egypt during
the Arab Spring, a time when Egypt was also reputed to have a repressive government.88 That company, Vodafone, in 2011 complied
with the Egyptian government’s request to shut down its network
and disconnect Egyptians from the Internet and mobile services.89
Vodafone also handed over data on Egyptians during anti-government strikes and protests.90 However, Vodafone had pushed back

86
See, e.g., Danielle Kehl & Tim Maurer, Confusing Sanctions Are Aiding Government Repression, SLATE (May 30, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/05/confusing_sanctions_are_keeping_important_technologies_from_iranian_activists.html (noting companies that have
opted out of doing business in Iran or have pulled their business out of Iran because
of associated legal risks); Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 18 (“[C]ompanies
take a risk averse approach and often continue to withhold their products until they
receive additional explicit authorization in the form of interpretive guidance or specific licenses.”).
87
Roughly seven out of ten Americans hold an unfavorable view of Iran.
Eighty-three percent believe that the Iranian government does not respect the rights
and freedoms of its citizens, which hurts the country’s image. Global Views of Iran
Overwhelmingly Negative, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 11, 2013),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/11/global-views-of-iran-overwhelminglynegative.
88
Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, New Threats, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 3,
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/07/03/net-threats (surveying experts
who describe Egypt as having a repressive regime that attempts to control information in the face of protests).
89
Telco Hall of Shame: Vodafone, ACCESS (Jan. 29, 2013, 12:39 PM),
https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2013/01/29/hall-of-shame-vodafone.
90
Tom Espiner, Vodafone Exec Warns against Tech Regulation, ZDNET (Feb. 11,
2009),
http://www.zdnet.com/vodafone-exec-warns-against-tech-regulation3039614610.
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against the government’s requests and only complied after the government threatened to use its own “off switch.”91 Additionally, Vodafone was transparent to the public about the situation. It updated
its privacy policy to acknowledge the tensions it faced between its
obligation to follow host country laws and its desire to protect users’
rights to privacy and freedom of expression.92 It also invited NGOs
to its Egyptian operations in January 2012 to observe the issues that
Vodafone employees faced in dealing with government demands.93
Despite all this, it received significant backlash from the public.94
Vodafone exposed itself to reputational risks simply due to the nature of doing business in Egypt.
Another illustrative example comes from Yahoo! in 2009. Michael Samway, former Vice President and Deputy General Counsel
of Yahoo!, was on his way to Singapore when a fake news story
broke out claiming that he was stopped in Iran and forced to disclose
information on Yahoo! users.95 Even though the story was false, the
news spread quickly, alarming Yahoo! users.96 Yahoo! posted statements regarding the situation and clarified that no Yahoo! representative had communicated with the Iranian government and that
Yahoo! had not disclosed information on its users to the government.97 A Yahoo! statement noted, “The power of the Internet
means that information travels quickly, including claims that are
false.”98 This story illustrates how even non-dealings with Iran are
fraught with public perception risks. News travels fast, and it is difficult to repair reputational damage after news spreads, even if that
91
James Glanz & John Markoff, Egypt Leaders Found ‘Off’ Switch for Internet,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/technology/16internet.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all&.
92
Privacy – Activity in 2011/12, VODAFONE (2012), http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/sustainability/sustainability_report/issue_by_issue/privacy/activity_in_2011-12.html.
93 Id.
94
See, e.g., Telco Hall of Shame: Vodafone, supra note 89 (placing Vodafone in a
virtual “hall of shame” for its actions in Egypt).
95
Larry Dignan, Retraction: Yahoo and Iran, ZDNET (Oct. 9, 2009, 1:05 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/retraction-yahoo-and-iran.
96 Id.
97
Nicki Dugan, No Yahoo! Meeting in Iran, YODEL (Oct. 9, 2009, 5:11 PM),
https://yodel.yahoo.com/blogs/yahoo-emea/no-yahoo-meeting-iran-2826.html;
Michael Samway, Iran Stories, YAHOO! BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM BLOG
(Oct. 9, 2009, 7:47 PM), http://yahoobhrp.tumblr.com/post/74887134903/iranstories.
98 Samway, supra note 97.
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news is proven false.99 As a result, companies tend to be extremely
careful in this space.
Furthermore, after the U.S. government’s “concerted campaign”
cautioning companies of the consequences of doing business in
Iran,100 companies see business in Iran as an inherently risky proposition, and it has become difficult for companies to shift their mindset to see it as anything but that. The JCPOA, by easing sanctions,
slightly de-stigmatizes business activities in Iran and mitigates perceived reputational risks, but reputational risks still abound.
3.1.3. Financial Risks
In addition to reputational concerns, the financial considerations
of a company wishing to do fee-based business in Iran are immense.
Because of extremely restrictive financial sanctions, a company
wishing to do business in Iran would have to find non-SDN banks.
The banks must be willing to assist with financial transactions involved in the authorized sale of apps and other ICT tools by processing payments and clearing transactions, all without debiting or
crediting accounts within Iran.101 This is a hard task since banks are
hesitant to assist given the risks involved.102 Banks that are willing
to bear these risks will likely charge a risk premium, creating additional costs and making it prohibitively expensive to make these
transactions.

99
See generally Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, Misinformation and Fact-checking: Research Findings from Social Science, NEW AM. FOUND.
(Feb. 2012),
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/Misinformation_and_Fact-checking.pdf
(summarizing social science research on misinformation, which says misinformation spreads easily and is difficult to correct).
100
Peter Feaver & Eric Lorber, Penalty Box, FOREIGN AFF. (June 6, 2014),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-06/penalty-box
(explaining the risks associated with U.S. companies doing business in Iran).
101 Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 560.516(a) (2010)
(“United States depository institutions are authorized to process transfers of funds
to or from Iran, or for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran, if the transfer . . . does not involve debiting or crediting an Iranian
account . . . [and] arises from an underlying transaction that has been authorized
by a specific or general license issued pursuant to this part . . . .”).
102
See, e.g., George Lopez & David Cortright, Financial Sanctions: The Key to a
'Smart' Sanctions Strategy, 72 DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE 327, 329 (1997) (“Banks are
acutely sensitive to uncertainty and the perception of risk, and they may be reluctant to make commitments in nations facing financial sanctions.”).
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These issues drive down the risk reward for companies, as they
drive up the risk relative to the reward of entering Iran. The risks
associated with transactions is especially severe for app transactions, which involve thousands of small payments, compared to
transactions for more expensive products that involve larger, infrequent transactions like laptops and operating systems. Since it is
difficult to find legal banking channels to Iranians and the penalties
of unintentionally violating sanctions are serious, “there is little incentive for companies to export fee-based goods and services.”103
3.2. ICT Sector Responses
3.2.1. Social Media Tools
With these considerations and risks in mind, several ICT companies have responded to sanctions changes in a limited fashion.
Companies are understandably hesitant to do business in Iran, even
after the easing of sanctions.104 With regard to social media tools,
Twitter has been made available to Iranians. The Iranian government blocks Twitter, but Iranians can access Twitter using virtual
private networks (“VPNs”), although these too are technically illegal under Iranian law.105 However, Iranians do not have access to a
key security feature: they cannot enable two-factor authentication
with Twitter because they cannot add their Iranian cellphone numbers.106 This makes it less secure for Iranians using Twitter and
makes advocacy efforts more vulnerable insofar as Twitter accounts
are made more susceptible to hacking. Twitter has not commented
on why Iranian cellphone numbers cannot be added to enable this
key security feature. Facebook too has been made available to Iranians but must be accessed through a VPN because of Iranian government censors.107
Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 19-20.
See Feaver & Lorber, supra note 100 (explaining the risks that would be
associated with U.S. companies doing business in Iran).
105
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Twitter Adds Iran, Cuba and 20 Other Countries to Location Options, MASHABLE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/01/27/twitter-iran-cuba.
106 Id.
107 Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Bars Social Media Again after a Day, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
17, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/middleeast/facebook-and-twitter-blocked-again-in-iran-after-respite.html.
103
104
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3.2.2. Instant Messaging, Telecommunication, and Video
Communication Tools
Communication tools have generally been made available in
Iran, but the use of some tools has been restricted. Google Hangout
is available in Iran.108 In 2009, Yahoo! purchased Maktoob, an Arab
Internet services company, and a web version of Yahoo! Messenger
has since been permitted.109 The use of Yahoo! Messenger on mobile
devices is restricted, however. It requires SMS verification for registration, whereby a four-digit code is sent to one’s mobile phone
which must then be put into the service for verification.110 However,
Iran has not been included in the list of authorized SMS codes.111
Yahoo! has not publicly explained the reasoning for its approach.
3.2.3. App Stores
App stores have blocked access in Iran in whole or in part because of the financial transactions involved with many apps. Some
companies have unblocked parts of their mobile app stores in Iran
in response to General License D, but limitations still remain. Since
August 2013, Apple has made App Store apps available for sale by
third parties.112 Apple updated its export compliance page and informed users that “[s]ome Apple goods and Apple software fall into
these categories,” referring to the categories of authorized goods
and services in General License D.113 Apple again acknowledged,
referring to General License D-1, that “[s]ome Apple goods and Apple software fall into these categories.”114 With this statement, Apple is saying that a third party that sells Apple apps in Iran would
108
Collin Anderson, Chart of Services Denied Due to Sanctions (Aug. 2014),
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nhCRNnKtTKlkya9dMP9jvyL1H_Onu0nOetugq_8aUSs/edit#gid=0.
109 Jeffrey Ghannam, Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings
of 2011, CENTER FOR INT’L MEDIA ASSISTANCE (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CIMAArab_Social_Media-Report-10-25-11.pdf.
110 Anderson, supra note 108.
111 Id.
112
Apple, Global Trade Compliance, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/more-resources/gtc.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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not violate its vendor agreement. However, Apple is not directly
offering apps there.
The Google Play Store has been made available in Iran, beginning in August 2013.115 However, it is “currently available only for
free apps and not for priced apps or apps that use in-app billing.”116
Also, availability requires action by developers, who must click the
opt-in button for availability in Iran.117 Google has not publicly explained why it is limiting its activity in Iran. The company is likely
acting based on the financial risks involved with offering for-pay
apps.
Some Iranians are able to bypass restrictions to access digital
goods, but this is limited to the technologically savvy. For example,
Iranians trying to directly access Apple’s digital sale of music, videos, and software through its iTunes and App Stores will see a “1009
error message,” which indicates that that service to the country has
been blocked.118 Iranians can bypass the block by using VPNs, registering Apple accounts with addresses outside Iran, and using foreign gift cards.119 However, since black market goods are expensive
and bypassing registration restrictions requires substantial technical
knowledge,120 black market goods and services are only available to
the wealthy and technologically savvy.

115
Android Developers, #AndroidDev, GOOGLE PLUS (Aug. 26, 2013),
https://plus.google.com/u/0/+AndroidDevelopers/posts/YCHtLJMXkYo (announcing, “Developers, starting today you can make your free apps available in
Iran.”). See also, Frederic Lardinois, Android Developers Can Now Use Google’s Play
Store to Distribute Their Free Apps in Iran, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/26/android-developers-can-now-use-googlesplay-store-to-distribute-their-free-apps-in-iran (discussing the implications of
Google’s announcement).
116 Android Developers, supra note 115.
117
Id. (“To add this country to your distribution, please visit the Pricing &
Distribution page in the Developer Console and select the checkbox for Iran directly.”).
118 Marcus George, Insight: Despite Sanctions, Apple Gear Booms in Iran, REUTERS
(July 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/us-apple-iranidUSBRE86C0AY20120713.
119 Id.
120 See Sallar Kaboli, What U.S. Really Did to Us Iranians, MEDIUM (Feb. 5, 2014),
https://medium.com/@sallar/what-u-s-really-did-to-us-iranians-ac1b0ee5b621
(detailing the methods Iranians must use to access U.S. services and software).
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3.2.4. Cloud Computing and Educational Platforms
Some cloud computing platforms that host websites have
blocked incoming connections from Iran for every website they host
due to uncertainty about what is permissible. For example, Google
App Engine blocks incoming connections from Iran.121 This means
that educational platforms that Google App Engine hosts, like Khan
Academy,122 are also blocked within Iran, preventing Iranians from
accessing useful educational tools. Coursera, another educational
platform, has itself blocked access to Iran due to sanctions restrictions.123 It explains, “Under the law, certain aspects of
Coursera’s course offerings are considered services and are therefore subject to restrictions in sanctioned countries . . . .”124 Coursera
had previously allowed connections to its service from Iran, acting
under an interpretation of “unclear” export regulations that led the
company to believe that sanctions allow educational platforms like
Coursera.125 It recently received information that its interpretation
was not in line with sanctions law and started blocking incoming
connections from Iran to come into compliance with sanctions.126
Iranians are therefore deprived from access to the many massive
open online courses available through Coursera. GoDaddy has recently started allowing incoming connections from Iran for websites
it hosts, beginning in December 2013.127

121
Collin Anderson, Sanctions: Reverse Filtering, GITHUB (June 8, 2012),
https://github.com/collina/Internet-Freedom-Repository/wiki/Sanctions:-Reverse-Filtering-%28%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B9%DA%A9%D9%88%D8%B3-%29; Anderson, supra note 108.
122 Khan Academy, The Khan Academy Scales and Simplifies with Google App Engine (2011) https://cloud.google.com/files/KhanAcademy.pdf.
123 Coursera, Update on Course Accessibility for Students in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and
Syria (Jan. 28, 2014, 8:22 PM), http://blog.coursera.org/post/74891215298/updateon-course-accessibility-for-students-in.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127
GoDaddy, TWITTER (Feb. 27, 2014, 9:59 PM) https://twitter.com/GoDaddy/status/439278639944060928 (“@NIACouncil Glad you noticed. Since Dec.
'13, Iran residents have been able to access and browse websites hosted with us. cc:
@pooriast ^S”). See also Pooria Asteraky, GoDaddy Stopped Sanctions Against #Iran,
POORIAST (Feb. 28, 2014), https://pooriast.wordpress.com/2014/02/28/godaddystopped-sanctions-against-iran.
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3.2.5. Products
Some products have been restricted in Iran due to the risks involved in doing business there. Nokia “ceas[ed] all revenue generating activities” ”due to the difficult business environment and increasing restrictions on doing business in Iran.”128
Apple has adopted a similar approach. Apple will not sell its
products directly in Iran.129 However, Apple will sell to individuals
who plan to sell to Iranians or take products into Iran.130 An Apple
spokesperson said, “Apple is no longer banned from selling Macs
and iOS devices to customers who plan to bring or send those products to Iran” as a result of OFAC’s issuance of General License D.131
Despite their legality, there have been misunderstandings about
sanctions regulations, which have restricted the sale of Apple products to Iran. In 2012, an Apple store in the United States, misunderstanding U.S. sanctions laws, refused to sell an iPad to a Persian
speaker.132 The State Department spokeswoman subsequently issued a statement clarifying that “there is no U.S. policy or law that
prohibits Apple or any other company from selling products in the
United States to anybody who’s intending to use the product in the
United States.”133
Some goods are available on the black market in Iran but their
availability is often in violation of U.S. sanctions law. Additionally,
black market goods have not been made widely available enough to
reach the masses. For example, Iranian merchants are able to source
Apple products through underground trade routes and transit
points in the Middle East, such as Dubai or Turkey, although illegally.134 However, these are subject to additional duties and shipping fees, and Iranian customs for these goods range from 4% for
portable products to 60% for larger components.135 Prices increase
Kehl & Maurer, supra note 86.
Sherr, supra note 58.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132
Jillian York, Can Apple Refuse to Sell a Laptop to an Iranian Citizen? Maybe,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(June
21,
2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/06/can-apple-refuse-sell-laptop-iraniancitizen-maybe.
133 Id.
134 George, supra note 119.
135 Id.
128
129

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

790

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:2

with these additional costs and the scarcity of black market goods,
making these products only available to the wealthy elite. Iranians’
access to these technologies is consequently limited to a small, wellresourced subset of the population.
Across services, software, and products, ICT companies have
been cautious to enter Iran. The current complexity that companies
face explains their concern.
3.3. Effects of Sanctions
3.3.1. Harm to Iranians
The result of the sanctions regime and the ICT sector’s limited
response to reforms has been to harm Iranians and impede the
United States’ stated goals.136 Sanctions in general can be “blunt instruments” that “cause substantial collateral damage to the populace at large.”137 “[P]olicy makers overestimate their ability to calibrate and control these tools of economic statecraft,” and the
narrative that the U.S. government can calibrate sanctions to the precision of a “silver bullet” is incorrect.138 Sanctions can have substantial unintended effects on the general populace in sanctioned countries.139
The sanctions regime against Iran imposes too many risks for
companies to justify doing business in Iran. As a result, companies
have failed to provide Iranian civilians with important ICT tools that
they need to mobilize, including technology that allows civilians to
136
Sanctions have failed to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals with respect to
empowering Iranians to mobilize and challenge their government. In other ways,
sanctions have fulfilled foreign policy goals. Sanctions have hurt Iran’s economy,
thereby impeding Iran’s ability to support terrorism and acquire and develop
weapons. See Clawson, supra note 4, at 92-95 (laying out some consequences of
sanctions, including reduced oil sales, a collapse in the value of Iranian currency,
and reduced access to foreign capital). But see Clawson, supra note 4, at 94-95 (arguing that sanctions have failed to achieve U.S. stated objectives and have not persuaded Iran to change its behavior because Iran thinks the “price is acceptably low.”
Iran believes it can acquire necessary financing and technology from other countries, and its “radical foreign policy does much to puff up Iranian nationalist
pride”).
137
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT &
BARBARA OEGG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 138 (3d ed. 2009).
138
Peter Feaver & Eric Lorber, The Sanctions Myth, 138 NAT’L INT. 22, 22-23
(July 2015).
139 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 137, at 138.
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spread information, communicate with one another, and counter
government censorship.140 Alternative tools available to Iranians
are often less secure, leaving Iranians more vulnerable to government monitoring.141 Sanctions have therefore harmed Iranians.
Providing Iranians with ICT tools remains important as the Iranian government continues to censor communications and repress
the civil and political rights of Iranians.142 The Iranian National Center for Cyberspace decides which websites should be blocked and
the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology executes Iran’s filtering policies.143 The Iranian government censors
roughly five million websites.144 This includes websites that the
government deems immoral and websites expressing dissenting
and independent views.145 Some of these are filtered, greeting users
with a message from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance
that the website has been blocked; others are shut down altogether,
presenting the user with nothing at all.146 Many Iranians wishing to
circumvent the government’s censorship use tools such as proxies
and VPNs: roughly 69.3% of Iranian youths that use the Internet use
140
This practice has been referred to as “reverse filtering.” Reverse filtering
is “the application of American Treasury sanctions to deny services to Iranian users,
generally identified by their IP address. Despite revisions to the law, made March
8 2010, extending a general license for information services and software to nongovernment users, misapplications and ambiguity continues to unnecessarily fetter
Iranians.” Anderson, supra note 121.
141
See id. (“[I]ndividuals receive software updates and [pirated] software in
markets and through media passed along, increasing their exposure to spyware
and other security issues. For Iran to have a safe Internet, capable of securely sustaining activism, these unfounded prohibitions must end.”).
142 See Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 37 (classifying Iran’s government as “repressitarian” because it is “repressive in terms of human rights practices
and authoritarian in terms of governance”).
143
Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Blocks Way to Bypass Internet Filtering System, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/world/middleeast/iran-blocks-software-used-to-bypassinternet-filtering-system.html?_r=0.
144
U.N. Secretary General, Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/26 (Feb. 20, 2015).
145
OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Iran (June 16, 2009), https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Iran_2009.pdf.
146
See Hamid Farokhnia, A Kafkaesque Realm of Cyber Censorship, PBS
FRONTLINE
TEHRAN
BUREAU
(May
9,
2010,
12:12
AM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/a-kafkaesque-realm-of-cyber-censorship.html#ixzz3ZILSJXvF (differentiating government censorship done through “filtering” with that done through “shutting
down”).
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circumvention tools.147 However, the Iranian government also
blocks Iranians’ attempts to bypass its censors.148
In addition to censoring and blocking access to certain websites
altogether, the Iranian government slows, or “throttles,” Internet
connection speeds to certain other websites.149 This renders websites nearly unreachable but draws less attention and is less detectable. As such, this practice is harder to combat and is an effective
way for the government to curb freedom of information and expression. The Iranian government also imposes restrictions on the press,
further limiting independent information.150
While President Rouhani is more moderate and has talked of lifting or reducing Internet censorship, it is unclear how much influence he has, as ultimate power still lies with Supreme Leader
Khamenei.151 President Rouhani has been able to strike common
ground with Khamenei to secure faster and more reliable Internet

147 Mahsa Alimardani, Nearly 70% of Young Iranians Use Illegal Internet Circumvention Tools, GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/09/16/nearly-70-of-young-iranians-use-illegalinternet-circumvention-tools.
148
Erdbrink, supra note 143 (describing the Iran Ministry of Information and
Communications Technology’s efforts to block software used by Iranians to bypass
the government’s Internet censors).
149
Collin Anderson, Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism
of Censorship in Iran 24 (Cornell University, Working Paper No. 1306.4361, 2013)
(analyzing data to identify periods during which the Iranian government attempted to throttle the Internet); Mahsa Alimardani, Iran's Internet Users Outsmart
Government in Cat-and-Mouse Censorship Game, GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY (Aug. 12,
2014), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/08/12/irans-internet-usersoutsmart-government-in-cat-and-mouse-censorship-game (describing the government’s attempts to throttle encrypted Internet traffic, including through anonymity
tools like Tor).
150 See Bowe, Blom & Freedman, supra note 24, at 42-43 (detailing the methods
by which the Iranian government restricts free press, including by monopolizing
broadcast facilities, fining newspapers, closing newspapers, revoking press licenses, and imprisoning journalists). Iran ranks 173 out of 180 countries in the Press
Freedom Index. Reporters without Borders, Press Freedom Index 2015, https://index.rsf.org. It ranks 190 out of 197 in the Freedom House Ranking. Freedom
House, Freedom of the Press 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedompress/freedom-press-2014. Reporters without Borders called Iran “one of the
cyber-censorship’s record-holding countries.” Reporters without Borders, supra
note 29, at 18.
151 Smoother Operator, ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21582567-hassan-rohani-strikes-liberaltone-he-ascends-presidency-smoother?fsrc=rss%7Cmea.
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speeds for Iranians.152 He has also expressed disfavor for Internet
censorship and has spoken of the need to provide the technological
needs of the youth, stating, “[W]e will have to do it tomorrow. If not,
the day after tomorrow.”153 However, just days after President Rouhani acknowledged that government filters are ineffective, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance blocked additional news websites.154 Also, social media networks like Facebook and Twitter
remain blocked.155
3.3.2. Failure to Achieve U.S. Goals
In addition to harming Iranians, sanctions have failed to achieve
U.S. foreign policy goals. Sanctions are “designed to coerce the leaders of the targeted regime to change policies.”156 Some might claim
that sanctions have been effective at achieving U.S. goals in Iran, as
sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy, strained the Iranian government, and therefore given the United States enough leverage to
exert diplomatic pressure and recently formulate the JCPOA of July
2015.157
However, sanctions are generally less effective against nondemocratic regimes like Iran where ultimate power lies with the Supreme Leader. In non-democratic systems, people have less power
to change their government’s policies in response to pressure from
sanctions.158 Sanctions that attempt to change government policies
152
Azadeh Moaveni, Iran: Rouhani’s Insistence on Faster Internet has Staying
Power, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/09/iran-rouhani-internet-3g-4g-supreme-leader-ali-khamenei.
153 Id.
154 Alimardani, supra note 147.
155 Id.
156 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 137, at 138.
157
Matthew Levitt & Peter Crail, Can Sanctions Be Effective in Halting Iran's
Nuclear Program?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 19, 2007),
http://www.cfr.org/iran/can-sanctions-effective-halting-irans-nuclear-program/p14500.
158 See David Lektzian & Mark Souva, An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset
and Success, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 848, 849 (2007) (arguing that sanctions are
less effective against nondemocratic target countries where sanctions allow the government to extract greater rents and do not result in political costs for the government because the larger populace, which bears the burden of the sanctions, is not
part of the government’s political coalition); Susan Hannah Allen, The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions, 52 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 916, 918 (2008) (summarizing scholarship that posits the ineffectiveness of sanctions in nondemocratic
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have such an effect only to the extent that the harm provokes the
population to pressure their government to change; but this is unlikely to occur if the government is not incentivized to respond to
the people’s demands.159 Additionally, where a country is able to
form a nationalistic narrative about sanctions, sanctions “can also
defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic response against
the international community . . . and by rallying the population behind the leaders whose behavior the sanctions are intended to modify.”160
A chief objective of the ICT sanctions regime is to support Iranian civilians’ freedom of information and communication and to
counter human rights abuses perpetrated by the Iranian government. Since the 2009 Iranian election, U.S. sanctions have attempted
“to support the ability of the domestic opposition in Iran to communicate, to reduce the regime’s ability to monitor or censor Internet communications, and to sanction Iranian officials that commit
human rights abuses.”161 Reforms have been undertaken in recognition of the importance of ICT tools to these goals.162 Sanctions laws
attempt to promote communications among Iranian civilians.
CISADA creates an exemption for technology that helps Iranians
communicate and access the Internet.163 The General License of 2010

countries, where social suffering is not translated into political costs for the government).
159 Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 5.
160 U.N. Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of
the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,
U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (Jan. 25, 1995).
161 KATZMAN, supra note 4, at 28.
162 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub. Notice 8086, State Department Sanctions Information and Guidance (Nov. 8, 2012) (“The United States government supports efforts to facilitate the free flow of information and freedom of expression in Iran . . .
and is cognizant of the vital importance of providing technology that enables the
Iranian . . . people to freely communicate with each other and the outside world. . .
. [T]he Iranian . . . government[] ha[s] taken steps to restrict the free flow of information and freedom of expression over their networks, to track and monitor the
communications of their people for the purpose of perpetrating human rights
abuses, or to disrupt networks in support of military operations against their own
people.”).
163
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-195, § 103, 124 Stat. 1328 (2010).
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allows free personal communications services,164 and General License D-1 adds authorizations for fee-based ICT services and products.165 Sanctions also aim to counter the Iranian government’s censorship of the Internet. CISADA prohibits the U.S. government from
contracting with foreign companies that sell Iran sensitive technology that could be used to monitor or censor information and communications.166 Executive Order 13606 bans U.S. trade with persons
determined to be operating or selling technology that enables the
Iranian government to disrupt or monitor computer usage of civilians.167 ITRSHRA sanctions persons that support Iran’s efforts to
censor or throttle the Internet,168 and Executive Order 13628 blocks
the property of such persons.169 In doing so, ITRSHRA restates that
a goal of sanctions is to counter Iran's efforts to violate the human
rights of Iranians.170
Despite this goal, the U.S. sanctions regime has failed to provide
Iranian civilians with the ICT tools necessary to support independent information, communication, and mobilization. Many important ICT goods and services remain unavailable or restricted in
Iran,171 impeding an important goal of the United States’ ICT sanctions regime against Iran. The to-date lack of effectiveness and harm
to Iranians resulting from sanctions demonstrate a need for reform.
4.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Government
There are several steps that need to be taken by the U.S. government, ICT companies, and civil society in order to improve the sanctions regime and bring it in line with U.S. interests and Iranians’
164
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License Related to Personal Communication
Services (2010).
165 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain Services,
Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (2014).
166 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 106.
167 Exec. Order No. 13606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24571 (Apr. 22, 2012).
168
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-158 § 403, 126 Stat. 1214, 1254 (2012).
169 Exec. Order No. 13628, 77 Fed. Reg. 62139 (Oct. 9, 2012).
170 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 101, 126 Stat. at 1217.
171
See supra Part 3.2 for an analysis of ICT tools that are unavailable or have
only been made available on a limited basis.
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freedoms. The U.S. government should target sanctions, implement
authorizations, issue reports, create financial routes, and make information more transparent.
4.1.1. Targeted Sanctions
The U.S. government should further target sanctions. In a 2013
report by the New America Foundation, Danielle Kehl, Tim Maurer,
and Sonia Phene suggest that the sanctions regime should be more
targeted.172 Ideally, targeted sanctions “focus on groups of persons
responsible for the breaches of the peace or the threats to international peace and security,” but “leav[e] other parts of the population
and international trade relations unaffected.”173
U.S. sanctions are already highly targeted, but further targeting
would maximize the negative impact on the Iranian government
while minimizing the negative impact on the general population.174
Targeting sanctions can include targeting specific actors and sectors
of the economy and creating exemptions for humanitarian goods
and services.175 These approaches tend to increase the effectiveness
of sanctions regimes compared to comprehensive sanctions.176
The approach that has been taken with humanitarian exceptions
to sanctions177 should be applied to ICT sanctions. In the late 1990s,
there was an increase in humanitarian authorizations.178 Sanctions
regimes with humanitarian exemptions generally have carve-outs
for food, medicine, and medical devices.179 The approach that was
Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 17.
Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, Peter Romaniuk, Aaron Halegua &
Natalie Reid, Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation,
THOMAS J. WATSON, JR. INST. FOR INT’L STUD. vi (2001).
174
See Daniel W. Drezner, How Smart are Smart Sanctions?, 5 INT’L STUD. REV.
107, 107 (2003) (summarizing literature on smart sanctions and underlying the importance of a good understanding of the target state’s domestic political economy).
175
Robin Geiss, Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call
for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-Up Assessment of
Long-Term Effects, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 167, 183 (2005).
176 Id. at 183-89.
177 For more on humanitarian exemptions, see id. at 186 (“Generally speaking,
humanitarian exemption clauses exclude certain categories of goods—typically,
food and medical supplies—from the sanctions regime.”).
178 Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 6.
179 Food and medicine were previously subject to a specific licensing program
under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A-67 (2000). OFAC issued general licenses authorizing
172
173

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/6

2015]

SANCTIONING FREEDOMS

797

applied to humanitarian aid in the 1990s should be applied to the
ICT sector.
This approach is starting to be applied to the ICT sector already
with the post-2009 reforms.180 It should continue to be applied and
should be applied with greater force and breadth. Despite recent
progress, Iranians are still having difficulty accessing communications tools.181 The U.S. government should target ICT sanctions to
restrain trade for only those technologies that are likely to be abused
by the Iranian government in a way that would threaten international peace and security. This would ensure that Iranians have access to communications tools that allow them to gain information
and organize political activity.
4.1.2. Authorizations
The exportation of ICT services and products should be regulated through authorizations, not exemptions. Sanctions regimes
can include exemptions and authorizations.182 Both enable certain
goods and services to be exported to sanctioned countries, but they
differ in the way they achieve this goal.183 Exemptions restrict U.S.
agencies from preventing the exportation of particular goods and
services, regulating on these issues, and issuing informational materials.184 Authorizations, on the other hand, allow U.S. agencies to
regulate these issues, grant licenses for the exportation of goods and
services that would have otherwise been prohibited under sanc-

their sale. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License (2012) (authorizing the exportation
and reexportation of medicine and basic medical supplies); U.S. Dep’t of Treas.,
General License (2011) (authorizing the exportation and reexportation of food
items); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Clarifying Guidance: Humanitarian Assistance to Iran
(Aug. 14, 2012) (clarifying that food and medicine donations are broadly authorized
and do not require specific licenses).
180 Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 6.
181 See examination supra Part 3.2 (reviewing ICT tool unavailability).
182 Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 6.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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tions, update and change the scope of these licenses, and enact penalties against infringers.185 The United States has used authorizations for humanitarian assistance, issuing temporary authorizations
for disaster relief aid.186
Granting ICT availability through authorizations as opposed to
exemptions would grant U.S. agencies greater flexibility to respond
to changes. Agencies would be more readily able to continue issuing interpretations and updates. It would also provide ICT companies with greater certainty: authorizations contain explicit language
about what companies can export, while exemptions leave more to
interpretation. There is a risk that authorizations could lead to some
uncertainty; general licenses issued by OFAC can also be revoked
by OFAC. However, OFAC can mitigate this uncertainty by reassuring major ICT companies through outreach.187
4.1.3. Reporting
The U.S. government should couple authorizations with reporting requirements. This would be similar to reporting guidelines for
investments in Burma.188 The U.S. government should require companies that want to enter Iran to report to the U.S. government on
their activities. As is done with investments in Burma,189 such reporting should include information on human rights policies and
procedures, payments to Iranian entities, property acquisitions, and
risk prevention and mitigation practices.
This would allow the U.S. government to track the role that companies are playing in Iran and assess the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. It would balance the government’s objectives in
providing ICT tools to facilitate information and communication
while addressing concerns about the exploitation of such tools by
the Iranian government. In doing so, it would allow for broader
Id.
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License No. 2 (2006) (adding a new general
license authorizing transactions in the business conduct of international organizations).
187 See discussion infra Part 4.1.5 (discussing information transparency).
188 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License No. 17 (2012); U.S. Dep’t of State, Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements (May 23, 2013), http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/responsible-investment-reporting-requirements-final.pdf.
189 Id.
185
186
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general licenses for ICT tools in Iran and make it easier for companies to do business there while still giving the government more
oversight. There is a risk that reporting requirements would deter
companies from doing business in Iran if companies begin to view
these requirements as too burdensome. However, the reporting requirements are likely to be small relative to the gains to be earned
from entering the largely untapped market.
4.1.4. Financial Routes
It is also important that OFAC facilitate financial aspects of the
ICT sector opening. As mentioned above, financial restraints create
additional risks for companies and dissuade them from entering
Iran.190 Some Iranians are able to obtain fee-based ICT tools by using
foreign credit cards or by “gifting,” but these solutions are not scalable or viable in the long term since they are only feasible for a
wealthy subset of the population.191 The JCPOA mitigates some of
these issues, but several concerns remain. OFAC has so far only
taken small steps to respond to civil society concerns and foreign
policy objectives. It has not eased financial restraints along with its
easing of restraints on ICT goods and services. It needs to take further steps to facilitate the availability of ICT tools. OFAC did this in
relation to financial restraints on the delivery of humanitarian aid
by creating humanitarian aid exceptions for financial transactions.192
Similarly, OFAC should create financial routes for the ICT sector in
order to facilitate the exportation of personal communication goods
and services.
4.1.5. Information Transparency
The U.S. government, through the Treasury, State, and Commerce Departments, should make information more available and
190

nies).

See discussion supra Part 3.1.3 (discussing the financial risks for compa-

191 Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 19-20 (examining the processing of
financial transactions).
192
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Clarifying Guidance: Humanitarian Assistance and
Related Exports to the Iranian People (Feb. 6, 2013) (clarifying that financial institutions are permitted to process financial transactions necessary to facilitate the
trade of humanitarian exports to Iran and financial transactions in support of trade
in certain food, medicine, and medical devices from the United States).
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transparent in order to clarify sanctions laws to companies. Although OFAC has answered some questions related to General License D-1 through the FAQs section of its website,193 OFAC should
frequently update answers to FAQs about the license.
Furthermore, OFAC should offer further interpretive guidance
on permissible actions, as it did after the General License of 2010.
Guidance should include information on the distinction between
“personal” and “commercial” ICT. General License D-1 “does not
authorize . . . [t]he exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of web-hosting services that are for commercial endeavors or
of domain name registration services.”194 The license does not make
it clear whether websites that are mainly used for personal communications but also allow commercial transactions would be covered
under existing licenses.195 Web-hosting companies also face a lot of
uncertainty about what websites they can permissibly host. For example, during the 2013 elections in Iran, U.S. web-hosting company
Just Host shut down the website of a candidate.196 To remedy this
ambiguity, OFAC should issue interpretive guidance defining “personal” and should offer examples of permissible goods and services.
OFAC should also conduct periodic outreach efforts with large
and mid-sized ICT companies to routinely inform them about recent
changes in sanctions laws. This is especially important since interpretive guidance has not been issued since General License D-1 was
set. OFAC should likewise reach out on the financial side to large
and mid-sized banks to clarify how the changes impact financial
transactions. This is crucial for true and sustainable success on the
193
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., OFAC FAQs: Iranian General License D-1,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx
(last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (answering questions regarding Iranian General License
D-1).
194 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License D-1 with Respect to Certain Services,
Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications (Feb. 7, 2014) (emphasis added).
195
Kehl, Maurer & Phene, supra note 55, at 20 (discussing the difference between personal and commercial communications technology).
196
Just Host shut down Mehdi Karoubi’s website, telling him that the company could no longer host his website www.karroubi.ir. The company cited U.S.
sanctions laws for the action, stating, “This sanction extends to include the countrycode top level domains .IR, .SY, .KP, and .CU (Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba).”
Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. Sanctions Force Closure of Opposition Leader’s Website, REUTERS
(Sept. 16, 2013, 8:14 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-iranusa-sanctions-idUSBRE98F0BU20130916.
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ICT side. Banks need to understand what is legal and what sanctions reform mean for them in order to feel comfortable assisting ICT
companies in making their technologies available.
Such guidance, interpretations, and outreach efforts would mitigate the risk that a company’s interpretation of sanctions laws
might differ from that of the government’s. This is a problem that
frequently arises, as a sanctions attorney explains: general license
authorizations are “open authorizations subject to interpretation.”197
“[C]ompanies construe them broadly to try to justify every conceivable transaction they want to engage in with the sanctioned country.”198 However, “the U.S. Government construes the general licenses narrowly in order to prevent the stretching of such
authorizations to those transactions which it actually doesn’t want
to be covered but for which the general authorization could conceivably extend to.”199 As a result of this discrepancy, companies “can
easily be held liable . . . if they do not fully comprehend or guess
OFAC’s intention correctly.”200
The U.S. government should make information transparent to
American civil society as well. This is a worthy goal because an informed civil society can appropriately compel the U.S. government
to reform the sanctions regime and pressure U.S. companies about
their business practices. Already, the Iranian diaspora in the United
States and other concerned U.S. persons have played an active role
in foreign policy discussions by lobbying Congress, publishing articles, and speaking to think tanks in order to bring about change in
the sanctions regime.201
To achieve information transparency, the U.S. government, including the Treasury, State, and Commerce Departments, should
publish information about the impact that sanctions has on civilians
in sanctioned countries. The U.S. Department of State publishes annual human rights reports on the human rights practices of various

197
Erich Ferrari, OFAC General License D: Is the “D” for Deceiving?, SANCTION
LAW, (Sept. 20, 2013), http://sanctionlaw.com/ofac-general-license-d-is-the-d-fordeceiving (recounting his experience as a sanctions attorney with companies under
investigation by OFAC).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See discussion infra Part 4.3.1 (discussing civil society advocacy).
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countries.202 Reports could incorporate information about the effect
sanctions have on civilians’ human rights.
The U.S. government should also incorporate human rights ratings into existing reports, rating companies based on the impact
their practices have on the human rights and freedoms of individuals in those countries. These assessments could be based on the ICT
sector guide put forth by the European Commission.203 The ratings
should include top ICT companies, both those that do and do not do
business in Iran. Companies that chose not to do business in Iran or
block authorized services and products in Iran should lose points:
this would mitigate the risk that companies would refrain from doing business in Iran out of fear that they might receive a low rating
relative to other companies doing business in Iran.
Furthermore, there needs to be information transparency to inform Iranians about U.S. sanctions and counter any misinformation
from the Iranian government. This would allow Iranians to appropriately pressure their government for reform. The U.S. government
is already making social media outreach efforts to Iranians. The U.S.
State Department’s Persian language spokesperson Alan Eyre discusses sanctions through his Twitter account and through interviews with Iranian newspapers.204 President Obama creates a video
on YouTube annually for Iranians also explaining sanctions.205
While there is no U.S. embassy in Iran, there is a virtual embassy
that explains U.S. policy.206 There is also a U.S. satellite radio program, Voice of America, which provides news, including explanations of sanctions, in English and Farsi among other languages.207
These efforts should become more frequent and be available on
more platforms to reach more people.

202 An example of these reports can be found at U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of
Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Iran 2014 Human Rights Report (2014) (reporting on the
Iranian government’s human rights practices).
203
See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ICT SECTOR GUIDE ON IMPLEMENTING THE
UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011) (detailing methods
of achieving human rights compliant business practices).
204 Alan Eyre, @AlanEyre1, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/AlanEyre1 (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
205
The White House, President Obama's Nowruz Message to the Iranian People,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-g2nZ5-4AlY.
206
VIRTUAL EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES, http://iran.usembassy.gov (last
visited Oct. 22, 2015).
207 VOICE OF AMERICA, http://www.voanews.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
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4.2. Companies
4.2.1. Making the Case to Companies
To get companies to export ICT tools to Iran, the ICT sector
needs to be persuaded to do business in Iran. There are several reasons ICT companies should enter Iran. First, there is a strong business case for entry. Iran is a large and nearly untapped market. It
has a sizable population of eighty million people, the second largest
in the Middle East and seventeenth largest in the world. 208 Iranians
are highly educated, and they are engaged technology and Internet
users.209 Internet usage among the population has steadily increased
from 8.1% in 2005, to 15.9% in 2010, and to 39.4% in 2014.210 The
percentage of individuals using the Internet is almost five times
what it was in 2005. Iran has a largely literate population of 89.4%.211
It also has a big youth population: the median age is 28.3,212 and
over 60% of the population is under thirty years old. 213 About 23.5
million youth use the Internet.214 Despite restrictions imposed by
the Iranian government, Iranians are still active online. In early
2009, there were about 60,000 blogs routinely updated in Iran.215 Iranian youth “gravitate towards the Internet to avoid cultural and political obstacles in their lives and expectations to follow social

208
Majid Rafizadeh, Doing Business with Post-Sanctions Iran: Risks and Opportunities, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/doing-business-with-post_b_7960484.html.
209
World Bank, Iran, Islamic Rep. (2015), http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-republic. See also Behrang Tajdin, Will Iran’s National Internet Mean
No
World
Wide
Web?,
BBC
NEWS
(Apr.
27,
2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22281336 (discussing the Iranian
government’s initiative to create a nationwide intranet and setting out the population’s ingenuity in accessing the Word Wide Web).
210
World
Bank,
Internet
Users
(per
100
People)
(2015),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2.
211
U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2015),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html.
212 Id.
213 Rafizadeh, supra note 208.
214 Alimardani, supra note 147.
215 John Kelly & Bruce Etling, Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture
in the Persian Blogosphere, HARVARD UNIVERSITY BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND
SOCIETY
(Apr.
2008),
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Kelly&Etling_Mapping_Irans_Online_Public_2008.pdf.
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norms.”216 Additionally, NGOs in Iran that would like to use ICT
tools to advertise to and educate Iranians on human rights issues
would provide a market for companies.
ICT companies that enter Iran would gain a competitive advantage. They would benefit from being some of the first companies
to enter Iran and would gain the opportunity to dominate the market. They would also avoid risks associated with not entering Iran
early, namely being left behind and being pressured by competitors
that make money off of their activity in Iran. Companies would also
benefit from reciprocal effects, such as family and friends of Iranians
hearing about the technology their Iranian acquaintances are using
and going on to use the same technology. Likewise, U.S. companies
should do business in Iran to place them on equal footing with companies in other nations that will surely be taking advantage of the
emerging market.217
Second, there is an ethical case to be made to companies. Many
ICT companies have great size, power, and reach. By entering Iran,
these companies can use their power to facilitate communication
among Iranians and make a positive impact in Iran. Crowdsourced
information from social media websites provides an opportunity to
spread information during protests.218 Non-Iranian reporters were
severely restricted during the 2009 elections, and so they had to rely
on Iranians posting information on social media websites.219 Addi-

216 Ali Asghar Kia, Iranian Youth Online: Identity between Traditional and Modern
Lifestyles, COMMUNITY BROADCASTING ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://www.cbaa.org.au/article/iranian-youth-online-identity-between-traditional-and-modern-lifestyles.
217
Eric Lorber & Elizabeth Rosenberg, Dollar Diplomacy in Tehran, FOREIGN
AFF. (July 14, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-0715/dollar-diplomacy-tehran (encouraging U.S. companies to enter Iran to “ensure
that Iran’s new commercial relationships do not pivot exclusively to Asia”).
218 Jessica Heinzelman & Patrick Meier, Crowdsourcing for Human Rights Monitoring: Challenges and Opportunities for Information Collection and Verification, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES: TRENDS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF USE, supra note 24 at 123, 129 (arguing that traditional human
rights reporting faces challenges of capacity, cost, and access that crowdsourcing
can solve).
219
See, e.g., Steve Herrmann, Social Media in Iran, BBC (June 16, 2009, 12:51
PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/legacy/theeditors/2009/06/social_media_in_iran.html (explaining BBC’s reasons for monitoring social media during the
2009 protests, including to counteract heavy restrictions placed on foreign journalists in Iran and based on a desire to follow the “huge ongoing, informed and in-
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tionally, increased access to U.S. products and services would increase security. Individuals in sanctioned countries are forced to use
alternative communication tools, which are often less secure than
products made in the United States.220 Alternatives are more vulnerable to government surveillance and interference, putting activists at risk.221 The contribution that ICT companies can make toward
advancing Iranians’ freedoms might even be noticed by U.S. consumers, who might go on to buy their products as a result.
Third, companies should be persuaded by the reputational effects of doing business in Iran. Just as doing business in Iran can
create reputational risks, failing to enter Iran can also provoke negative press. Entering Iran in a way that improves Iranians’ freedoms
can create positive press for companies, which might in turn inspire
U.S. consumers to buy their goods and services.
Fourth, there is a legal case to be made. Corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) is an expanding area of law. Increasingly, domestic
and international legal regimes have expanding CSR laws.222 Companies should see CSR laws as something they can get ahead of and
use to their advantage. By ensuring CSR compliance, companies can
improve their bottom line and lower reputational and legal costs
from non-compliance.

formative discussion in Iran between people who care deeply about what is happening there and who are themselves monitoring everything they can, then circulating the most useful information and links”); Heinzelman & Meier, supra note 218,
at 128-129 (“[D]uring Iran’s ‘Twitter Revolution,’ CNN’s David Mattingly stated in
one news case, ‘Because Western journalists are not allowed to cover these events,
we are looking at the social networking sites and seeing what’s posted on there.’”).
220
See Anderson, supra note 121 (describing how tools available to Iranians
“increas[e] their exposure to spyware and other security issues”).
221 Sanctions have led to a similar situation in Sudan, where sanctions are also
imposed. Sudanese activist Anwar Dafa-alla said of the sanctions, “The U.S. sanctions have empowered the government security agencies against the activists
online, because there [are] few anonymity tools available for them, and many of
them are not tech savvy. Not being able to update your software makes you an
easy catch for the highly trained security officers.” Danielle Kehl & Tim Maurer,
Time to Rethink Tech Sanctions against Sudan, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2014, 10:24 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/01/sudan_sanctions_are_keeping_secure_communications_tools_from_activists.html.
222
See John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda 17-18 (Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 38, June 2007) (chronicling
the “expanding jurisdictional web” of corporate social responsibility laws and the
resulting “increased liability risks” that companies face).
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4.2.2. Leadership
After ICT companies are persuaded that entering Iran is a valuable proposition, there needs to be leadership within companies that
is willing to make tough decisions and take risks. Leaders at companies will have to resolve tensions between those that want to take
advantage of potentially lucrative business opportunities and those
that want to steer clear of risks accompanying such business opportunities. Leaders at companies need to be willing to boldly pursue
lucrative business opportunities, even when the legal compliance
costs might tempt leaders to stay away from such opportunities.
There also needs to be leadership within the industry. Companies with the resources to do so should do business in Iran and be
among the first players in the market. The ICT sector has had a history of a lot of interplay: if one company does something, others
will soon follow.223 Therefore, companies should lead other companies in the ICT sector by acting and resultantly persuading others to
act on the business opportunities in Iran.
4.2.3. Consultation
In addition to leadership, companies within the ICT sector
should consult with one another in regards to sanctions. This could
be similar to other multi-stakeholder initiatives, like the Global Network Initiative.224 The effort should similarly encourage an exchange of best practices regarding ways to do business in Iran in a
See generally supra Part 3.2.
The Global Network Initiative includes ICT companies (Facebook, Google,
LinkedIn, Microsoft, Procera Networks, and Yahoo!), eight academic organizations,
thirteen civil society organizations, and nine investors. It was established in response to “government pressure to comply with domestic laws and policies in ways
that may conflict with the internationally recognized human rights of freedom of
expression and privacy” and aims to “protect and advance freedom of expression
and privacy in the ICT sector” by providing a framework of best practices. GLOBAL
NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org (last visited Oct.
23, 2015). Of the initiative, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “The initiative goes beyond mere statements of principles and establishes mechanisms to
promote real accountability and transparency.” Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Internet
Freedom, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. But see Ronald Deibert & Rafal
Rohozinski, Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of Cyberspace Security, 4 INT’L POL.
SOCIOLOGY 15, 26 fn. 7 (2010) (“The effectiveness of such self-regulation is untested
and still questionable”); Justine Nolan, The China Dilemma: Internet Censorship and
223
224
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human rights promoting manner. Such an initiative would make
more hesitant companies more comfortable about entering Iran.
4.2.4. Human Rights Assessment
Once a company enters Iran, it should assess its human rights
impact to conform to the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, as set out by former U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Business and Human Rights John Ruggie.225 Under the Principles,
businesses “should avoid infringing on the human rights of others
and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they
are involved.”226 They should “avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur.”227 These obligations apply
“regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and
structure.”228
Companies should have policies and practices to meet these responsibilities.229 The policies should indicate expected personnel
and business partners, indicate procurement practices, set financial
and performance incentives for personnel, and be made publicly
available. Companies should conduct due diligence to identify, prevent, and mitigate human rights impacts, both actual and potential.
They should also draw on human rights expertise and consult with
potentially affected groups, such as Iranian protest groups, in order
to more fully appreciate human rights risks.
Human rights assessments should be started as early as possible
after a company enters Iran and should be conducted at regular intervals. Companies should act upon findings in human rights assessments and track the effectiveness of their responses. Companies
Corporate Responsibility, 4 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 24 (2009) (“Voluntary codes of conduct
that aim to delineate corporate responsibility for human rights can aid protection
of such rights but cannot alone ensure uniform protection.”).
225
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises),
Report on Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21,
2011).
226 Id. at 13.
227 Id. at 14.
228 Id. at 14.
229 Id. at 15.
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should also publicly release information about their practices, including information about government requests to restrict information and responses to these requests. Google has done this by
releasing a transparency report online since 2010.230
Cloud computing platforms should be transparent with consumers. They do not always notify new or existing customers about
their actions. When GoDaddy was restricting access to Iranians attempting to access websites it hosts, GoDaddy did not inform customers.231 It even claims that web hosting “allows people around
the world to find and view your website,” without exception.232 This
is a problem because many hosted websites might not know they
are being blocked by their hosting companies. Consequently, advocacy and education websites wishing to reach Iranians might not
know their efforts are being blocked. Without such information,
they cannot act appropriately and seek other avenues to reach Iranians. Although hosting services might not want to inform customers
that they are blocking websites in Iran and likely receive subsequent
backlash, these hosting services should do more to notify customers
by clarifying that websites hosted through them will not be available
in Iran.
4.3. Civil Society
4.3.1. Advocacy
There are also several steps civil society should take. Civil society should continue imploring politicians to reform the sanctions regime. Advocacy has led to the easing and clarification of ICT sanctions in the past: Iranian political and civil society, concerned about
Iranians and their Internet freedom, petitioned Congress, published
articles, and spoke to think tanks.233 The National Iranian American
230
The report includes information about government requests to remove
content and requests for information about Google users. Google, Transparency Report, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
231
Pooria Asteraky, Revealing a Hidden Story about GoDaddy’s Hosting,
POORIAST (Jan. 26, 2013), http://pooriast.wordpress.com/2013/01/26/revealing-ahidden-story-about-godaddys-hosting.
232
GoDaddy, Web Hosting, http://www.godaddy.com/hosting/web-hosting-new.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
233
Nat’l Iranian Am. Council, Accomplishments, http://www.niacouncil.org/about-niac/accomplishments (last visited May 5, 2015).
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Council, for example, conducted campaigns against broad sanctions
by publishing articles,234 issuing public letters,235 and conducting interviews.236 The organization successfully advocated for the lifting
of sanctions that impeded the delivery of humanitarian goods and
services.237 It also successfully advocated for lifting sanctions that
restricted Iranian civilians’ ability to communicate with one another
and the outside world. Its campaigns led to the removal of sanctions
on online communications tools like MSN Messenger, Facebook,
and YouTube.238 They also led to the lifting of sanctions on communications technologies, including hardware like laptops and mobile
phones, services like VPNs, and anti-malware software.239 Another
group, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, has also
tracked and disseminated information about ICT sanctions to put
pressure on the U.S. government to reform its sanctions.240 Civil society can continue to facilitate progress in the sanctions regime by
continuing to urge politicians to reform the regime.

234
Nat’l Iranian Am. Council, Sanctions, http://www.niacouncil.org/tag/sanctions (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
235
29 Organizations Warn Congress Against New Iran Sanctions, NAT’L IRANIAN
AM.
COUNCIL
(Nov.
19,
2013),
http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=10061 (posting a letter from the National Iranian American Council and twenty-eight other organizations warning key
Senate members against additional sanctions).
236
Which Iran Will We Choose?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/archive/segment/which-iran-will-wechoose/52b8825478c90a4ce600069d (interviewing Reza Marashi, Research Director
of the National Iranian American Council).
237
Jamal Abdi, NIAC Applauds Easing of Humanitarian Sanctions on Iranians,
NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.niacouncil.org/niac-applauds-easing-of-humanitarian-sanctions-on-iranians.
238
Phil Elwood, NIAC Efforts to Reform Sanctions on Internet Tools for Iranians
Successful, NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5961.
239 Jamal Abdi, NIAC Applauds Lifting of Communications Sanctions for Iranians,
NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (May 29, 2013), http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9263&security=1&news_iv_ctrl=1261.
240
See, e.g., Crippling Sanctions, INT’L CAMPAIGN FOR HUM. RTS. IN IRAN (Apr.
29, 2013), http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/04/crippling-sanctions (explaining the difficulties suffered by Iran because of sanctions imposed by the
United States and the European Union).
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4.3.2. Information Dissemination
Civil society should also continue disseminating information on
the impact that sanctions are having on Iranians’ access to ICT tools.
Civil society plays an important role in informing and mobilizing
civilians. Civil society should continue these efforts by publishing
information on sanctions regulations and on ICT companies’ practices within Iran. This would in turn encourage more people to join
the cause in lobbying for reforms of the sanctions regime and in
pressuring companies to react to existing opportunities within the
sanctions regime.
Civil society should also incorporate sanctions-related rankings
into existing ranking projects. A potential space for such rankings
is the Ranking Digital Rights Index.241 Rankings could also be added
to reports like the Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report.242
The ranking should evaluate companies on the extent to which their
actions facilitate access to information in regards to sanctions regimes. With respect to Iran, this should include companies’ willingness to act under General License D-1 and the breadth of their activities in Iran. This would be a simple way to inform the public of
companies’ activities in providing access to information and would
consequently support public advocacy efforts to effectuate government and company policy change.
These recommendations, if implemented, would ensure that the
sanctions regime both supports Iranians’ freedoms and furthers U.S.
foreign policy goals.
5.

CONCLUSION

Although U.S. ICT sanctions against Iran have not had the intended effect of providing Iranians with access to ICT tools, implementation of the recommendations above would both improve Iranians’ freedoms and further U.S. interests. The sanctions regime
and the resulting responses by the ICT sector have so far had the
unintended effect of limiting Iranians’ freedoms and leaving them
241
Rebecca MacKinnon, Ranking Digital Rights, RANKING DIGITAL RIGHTS,
http://rankingdigitalrights.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
242
See, e.g., Freedom on the Net, FREEDOM HOUSE (2014), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf
(reporting on Internet freedom by country).
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vulnerable to censorship and monitoring by the Iranian government. To remedy this, the U.S. government should further target
sanctions, create more authorizations, ease financial restrictions,
and increase information transparency. The government should follow the achievement of the JCPOA with reforms in the ICT space to
achieve further progress. ICT companies should respond to sanctions reforms by taking advantage of the business opportunities to
be gained from exporting their technologies to Iran in a human
rights compliant manner. Furthermore, civil society should continue advocating for necessary reforms of the sanctions regime.
These steps would have the result of providing Iranians with the
ICT tools they need to access information, communicate, and mobilize.
Additionally, lessons learned from the sanctions regime against
Iran should be applied across all sanctions regimes. The United
States should follow these recommendations with respect to the exportation of ICT tools in other sanctioned countries. There have already been similar efforts at reform with respect to other countries
as part of the United States’ effort to support the free flow of information and communication worldwide. Since the 2010 General License was issued for Iran, Sudan, and Cuba, a similar policy has
been applied to Syria.243 Also, OFAC has applied the approach it
took with General License D to Sudan244 and Cuba.245 Most recently,
there have been developments authorizing personal communications tools in the Crimea region of Ukraine to support information
243 General License No. 5 Related to Internet-Based Services was incorporated
into 31 C.F.R. § 542 (2011) (permitting Internet-based personal communication services under the sanctions regime against Syria, provided that such services are publicly available at no cost to the user).
244 Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538 (2015) (licensing personal
communications software, hardware, and services).
245 Definitions found in General License D closely resemble those found in the
2009 Commerce Department’s Cuban Consumer Communications Devices exception. This exception was amended to eliminate the donation requirement in 2015.
Cuba: Providing Support for the Cuban People, 80 Fed. Reg. 2286 (Jan. 16, 2015)
(amending sanctions against Cuba to authorize the exportation of items intended
to strengthen civil society and improve information flows, including the sale of certain communication tools). See also Danielle Kehl, Increasing the Free Flow of Information to Cuba under U.S. Sanctions, NEW AM. FOUND. (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/increasing-the-free-flow-of-information-tocuba-under-us-sanctions (identifying reforms in sanctions against Cuba as part of
the U.S. government’s broader efforts to reform comprehensive sanctions and support information flows).
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flows.246 This trend should continue to be applied across the world
and should be extended to fee-based ICT tools. Such reform would
support civilians’ access to information and freedom of expression,
and it would enable civil society in sanctioned countries to organize
and mobilize against repressive governments.

246
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Russian Sanctions: Revisions and Clarifications
for Licensing Policy for the Crimea Region of Ukraine (May 22, 2015) (amending
the Export Administration Regulations to facilitate Internet-based communications
with persons in the Crimea region of Ukraine); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License
No. 9 (2015) (authorizing personal communication software that is not fee-based in
the Crimea region of Ukraine). See also Danielle Kehl, U.S. Government Authorizes
the Export of Internet-based Communications Tools to Crimea, NEW AM. FOUND. (May
26, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/us-government-authorizes-the-export-of-internet-based-communications-tools-to-crimea (recognizing the importance of the reform for the U.S. government’s efforts in ensuring the free flow of
information).
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